Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford Moral Theory)
The chapter pays particularly close attention to the issue of whether all practical reasons that is, reasons for action are teleological. Keywords: value , teleology , promotion , epistemic reasons , practical reasons.
Douglas W. He is currently working on his second book: Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.
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In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons.
Douglas W. Portmore (Arizona State University) - PhilPeople
Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be ranked, not according to their impersonal value, but according to how much reason the relevant agent has to desire that each outcome obtains and that, when outcomes are ranked in this way, we arrive at a version of consequentialism that can better account for our commonsense moral intuitions than even many forms of deontology can.
What's more, Portmore argues that we should accept this version of consequentialism, because we should accept both that an agent can be morally required to do only what she has most reason to do and that what she has most reason to do is to perform the act that would produce the outcome that she has most reason to want to obtain.